Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment— The Recommendation for Time-Certain Development: Architectural Considerations

16 June 2008

Dr. Peter Hantos Software Acquisition and Process Department Software Engineering Subdivision

Prepared for:

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Space and Missile Systems Center Air Force Space Command 483 N. Aviation Blvd. El Segundo, CA 90245-2808

Contract No. FA8802-04-C-0001

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The Recommendation for Time-Certain Development: Architectural Considerations Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment—

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GSAW/ACE 2008



Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment – The Recommendation for Time Certain Development: Architectural Considerations

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Mission-Oriented Investigation and Experimentation (MOIE) Research Program (Software Acquisition Task)

❖ Inspiration

All I really need to know about estimation I learned in kindergarten and from Dr. Barry Boehm...



Agenda

- Objectives
- Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) Recommendations
- What is DAPA
- Recommendations to be discussed
- The reasons behind Time Certain Development
- March 14, 2007 Air Force Memorandum
- What is Time Certain Development?
- Confidence in a Software Estimate The Cone of Uncertainty
 - Estimating software size
- The Fallacy of Seamless Size-Effort-Time Trade
- Conceptual Trade Space for Architectural Options
 - Space-specific Considerations
- Accuracy Dependency on the Development Life Cycle Phase
- The Experts' Voices
- Conclusions
- Acronyms
- References

Objectives

- Explain the context and background of the DAPA recommendation for Time Certain Development
- Explore the underlying estimation issues impacting recommendation for Software-Intensive Systems successful implementation of the DAPA
- Emphasize the importance of software architecture in software cost estimation



DAPA (Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment)

What is DAPA?

- The DAPA project is an integrated assessment of every organization, legal foundations, decision methodology, aspect of military acquisition, including requirements, oversight, and checks and balances
- It is a response to a 2005 DOD Directive by Mr. Gordon England, then Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense
- The DAPA report is the result of this project
- Developed by a panel led by Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish (Retired), USAF
- 107 experts and 130 other government and industry acquisition professionals were interviewed
- The full report is available at [DAPA 2006]



DAPA Recommendations to be Discussed

Budget

- Transform and stabilize the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process
- Adjust program estimates to reflect high confidence
- chance of completing development at or below estimated cost High confidence programs defined as a program with an 80%
- Major acquisition programs would be fully funded at a level that would cover the program from Milestone A through the first delivery of low rate production

The Acquisition Process

- acquisition strategy for major weapons system development Establish Time Certain Development as the preferred
- Time Certain Development adds "time" as a factor critical to the discussion of the need to balance cost and performance
- Deliver useful military capability within a constrained period of time
- Make time a KPP (Key Performance Parameter)



"Back to Basics" Air Force Directive

- Relevant elements of the March 14, 2007 Memorandum by the Under Secretary of the Air Force*
- Delivery times should be based on a Time Certain Development principle
- A specific time frame must be established in which a specific block of capability will be fielded, starting at Key Decision Point B (KDP B)
- Program estimates should be based on an 80% confidence level by KDP-B

^{*} Undersecretary of the Air Force Memorandum, Subject: "Back to Basics" and Implementing a Block Approach for Space Acquisition, March 14, 2007.




The Reasons Behind Time Certain Development

- Tension between the DOD acquisition culture and the needs of Combatant Commanders
- The prevalent culture is to strive initially for the 100% solution in the first article delivered to the field
- On the other hand, Combatant Commanders have urgent needs that are tied to ongoing operations
- Making time a KPP seems to be the vehicle to express this customer urgency to the Developer
- Making time a KPP is a value statement of the Customer



What is Time Certain Development?



Acronyms:

CDR: Critical Design Review

DOD: Department of Defense

DODI: Department of Defense Instructions

IOC: Initial Operational Capability
NSS: National Security Space

PDR: Preliminary Design Review


SDR: System Design Review SRR: System Requirements Review

Notes:

* DODI 5000.2 has a single acquisition life cycle model only. The chart compares the DOD model to the NSS' Small Quantity System Model, showing the first acquisition increment. Trick question: What do you think why is "Build approval" in the NSSAP 03-01 model not a formal, major milestone?



Cone of Uncertainty in Software Cost Estimation*



* Based on [Boehm 1981]



Software Size Is Always Chronically Underestimated

Software cost estimation's "dirty little secret":

- For most parametric cost estimation models software size is a major driver but size estimation accuracy is not part of the published cost estimation model accuracies
- Software Cost Estimation Model accuracy data assumes a 100% software size accuracy

Estimating software size is actually quite difficult


Code) data was published for three different datasets [Bozoki 2005]: The following Actual/Estimate KSLOC (Thousand Source Lines Of

Actual Size Range Ratio of Mean for Accepted Actual/Estimate	С)	6 - 71 1.61	45 - 320	
Datasets* Actual S Of Examined for Ac	Programs Software	A 6	B 45	

^{*} Note that actual program details are hidden due to confidentiality reasons



The Fallacy of Seamless Size-Effort-Time Trade




However, in reality there are only a finite number of architectural options.

Legend: CER - Cost Estimation Relationship



The Conceptual Trade Space for Architectural Options (Solution Sets)*




- Consequences
- During initial estimation:
- For the Cost Schedule Capabilities trade we have only a few options
- During development:
- Requirements can not always be simply "dropped" in order to maintain cost or schedule objectives



^{*} Diagram is based on [Rice 2000]

Space-Specific WBS (Work Breakdown Structure)



Example (Ground Thread)

Ground, Space, User, Launch

Ground Elements: Mission Control, TT&C,


Mission Control Subsystems: Master

Master Control SW Items: Mission

Timeline, Define Vehicle Configuration, Plan Mission Planning SW Units: Generate

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Space-Specific Software Discussion



Accuracy Dependency on the Development Life Cycle Phase

E.g., the COCOMO II (Constructive Cost Model) family of models* strategies/objectives associated with life cycle phases: distinguishes between three different estimation

Early prototyping stage

The objective is to estimate the cost of early risk-reduction activities.

Early design stage

 The objective is to explore the cost of alternative software/system architecture options and the concept of operations.

* Post-architecture stage

 The objective is to estimate the cost of actual development for the software product.

Caveats:

consequently the estimation accuracy) is low for the early stages The number of available data-points for calibration (and

dependent on facts learned and design decisions made in prior The models can only be used successively, and their use is *



^{*} Source [Boehm 2000]

The Experts' Voices

Barry Boehm [Boehm 1981]

defined, it actually represents a range of software products, and compensate for our lack of definition or understanding of the software job to be done. Until a software specification is fully technique, there is no way we can expect the technique to a corresponding range of software development costs." "Whatever the strengths of a software cost estimation

George Bozoki [Bozoki 2005]

* "SSM (Software Sizing Model) can be employed in any phase whose operational and functional characteristics are defined." partition the software project into modules or components of the software development cycle in which the user can

Steve McConnell [McConnell 2006]

"Meaningful commitments are not possible in the early, wide commitments until they have done work to force the Cone to part of the Cone. Effective organizations delay their



Conclusions

- Time Certain Development as an acquisition strategy poses very difficult engineering challenges
- Even state-of-the-art estimation and engineering approaches could not support successful implementation for large programs
 - Accurate size estimation requires the full comprehension of the implementation consequences of "illities"
- Such analysis can only be based on a detailed and adequately documented software architecture
- The root-cause of the dissatisfaction with the performance of the Acquisition System lies with misstated or misunderstood unrealistic, and mismanaged expectations
- engineering practices and the human dimensions of the Acquisition While improving estimation accuracy is certainly beneficial, further improvement efforts should focus on deeper understanding of System
 - Topics for further discussion
- Pros and cons of making time a KPP
- How to really address the concerns of the commanders in the field

Final conclusion: Estimating the unprecedented remains a black art...



Acronyms

CDR	CDR Critical Design Review
CER	CER Cost Estimation Relationship
COCOMO	COCOMO Constructive Cost Model
DAPA	DAPA Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment
DOD	DoD Department of Defense
DODAF	DODAF Department of Defense Architecture Framework
DODI	DOD Instruction
100	Ioc Initial Operational Capability
KDP	KDP Key Decision Point
KPP	KPP Key Performance Parameter
KSLOC	KSLOC Thousand Source Lines of Code
MOIE	MOIE Mission-Oriented Investigation and Experimentation
NSS	NSS National Security Space
PDR	PDR Preliminary Design Review
PPBE	Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
SDR	
SRR	System Requirements Review
TPM	TPM Technical Performance Measure
USAF	USAF United States Air Force
USC	USC University of Southern California
WBS	WBS Work Breakdown Structure



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